At the Crossroads of Orthodoxy: An Analysis of Imām Abū Ḥanīfah's Letter toʿUthmān al-Battī
Ustadha Sarah Salih
Introduction
An Early Legal School of Thought
Imām Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150 AH / 767 CE) passed away in 150 Anno Hegirae, making him one of the earliest scholars of our tradition. He was an authoritative codifier of Islamic law (mujtahid) whose views were accepted, challenged, and ultimately carried forward by his cerebral students, better known as his companions (ṣaḥibayn). What they began resulted in what we know today as the Ḥanafī Legal School of Thought (madhhab). Studied and adhered to across the world, this legal school needs no introduction. Countless pages have been written detailing its inception, development, and codification.
An area of study that piques the curiosity of anyone interested in this school and its key figures is the actual works written by Imām Abū Ḥanīfah himself. The challenge posed here is that the Imām wrote centuries before the wide dissemination of written works. It was commonplace for anything written to soon become extinct, only known to later readers via references made to them in later works. This begs the question: how many of the works of Imām Abū Ḥanīfah do we know of, and how many can accurately be attributed to him?
The Works of Imām Abū Ḥanīfah
A total of five works are attributed to Imām Abū Ḥanīfah. They are listed below with a brief statement on their purpose and accuracy of attribution:
Al-Waṣīyah (transmitted by Qāḍī Abū Yūsuf (d. 182 AH / 798 CE)) — Although the attribution of this work to the Imām is questionable, its contents are generally agreed upon by Māturīdī scholars.
Al-ʿĀlim wal-Mutaʿallim (transmitted by Abū Muqātil Ḥafṣ b. Muslim al-Samarqandī (d. 236 AH / 850 CE)) — This is a question-and-answer style work. Questions of theology were posed to Imām Abū Ḥanīfah, and his answers were recorded by his student.
Al-Fiqh al-Akbar I (transmitted by Abū Muṭīʿ al-Balkhī (d. 234 AH / 849 CE))
Al-Fiqh al-Akbar II (transmitted by Ḥammād b. Abī Ḥanīfah (d. 169 AH / 785 CE)) — The ascription of this work to the Imām is highly questionable. It is often confused with the first Al-Fiqh al-Akbar and its transmission is attributed to his son.
Risālah ilā ʿUthmān al-Battī (transmitted by ʿUthmān al-Battī (d. 143 AH / 760 CE)) — A letter that addressed theological points which will be the focus of this article. It is the only work that is attributed with confidence to the Imām due to various factors outlined below.
An Accurate Attribution
There are a number of things that ought to be taken into account to ascertain whether the attribution of a text to its author is accurate. One reason that authenticating texts is more challenging than authenticating Prophetic hadiths is because the same level of scrutiny was not applied to the transmission of entire texts versus individual narrations. Entire texts were generally considered authentic in their attribution if they fulfilled the following criteria as listed by Siddiqa Saidzada:[1]
“Authorship Mentioned by Early Sources: Early and contemporary scholars mention that Imām Abū Ḥanīfah authored this text.
Attestation of the Contents: There are chains of transmission (asānīd) for the text, and ideally multiple chains attest to its contents.
Citations of the Text: Other scholars quote from this work, lending further credibility to its attribution.
Temporal Consistency: The content of the text reflects the intellectual atmosphere of the time, avoiding anachronisms.”
Imam Abū Ḥanīfah’s letter to ʿUthmān al-Battī is the only text out of the five aforementioned ones that fulfills every aspect of the above criteria. The fact that it was transmitted by al-Battī himself is also indicative of its authenticity.
Historical Context
Who was ʿUthmān al-Battī?
Abū ʿAmr ʿUthmān b. Muslim b. Jarmūz al-Battī[2] (d. 143 AH / 760 CE) was a contemporary of Imām Abū Ḥanīfah who was originally from Kūfah. He later moved to Baṣrah where he became a faqīh (jurist). Imam Zāhid al-Kawtharī mentions that he was a mujtahid in his own right, but like many scholars of his time, his school of thought was not preserved. There are, however, a number of his opinions transmitted by Imam al-Ṭaḥāwī, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, and Ibn Mundhir. Ibn Jarīr did not include the opinions of al-Battī in his work on scholarly differences. He is considered a reliable narrator of hadith[3]. However, it has been narrated by Ibn Ḥajar (d. 852 AH / 1449 CE) that he was criticised for passing legal verdicts based on his reasoning (raʾy) as opposed to directly from textual evidence (naql) which is indicative of a general attitude that was held towards scholars hailing from this region. Al-Kawtharī mentions that Imām Abū Ḥanīfah and al-Battī had multiple exchanges but this was the only one that was preserved[4]. This is suggestive of a culture of active scholarly exchange and engagement, the nature of which will be explored below.
Content Overview: The Epistolary Refutation
The premise of the exchange between Imam Abū Ḥanīfah and ʿUthmān al-Battī is that the latter had attributed irjāʾ to the Imam. The Murjiʾah were an unorthodox sect who believed that deeds (ʿamal) were not a fundamental component of faith. That is, you can be a Muslim without doing the deeds of a Muslim so long as you believe internally in the tenets of the faith. While the precise articulation of this view differed among those who ascribed themselves to the Murjiʾah, this idea formed the basis of their theological differences with the orthodox majority.
Although this was the primary claim of al-Battī against the Imam and the primary subject of the letter in response, Imam Abū Ḥanīfah used this opportunity to relay his methodology of reasoning, which forms the premise of the Ḥanafī legal school as we know it today. It is important to note, as pointed out by Joseph Schacht,[5] that this work was addressed to a specialist and therefore, these foundational principles were elucidated with the scholar in mind.
The letter begins with a cordial introduction followed by the Imam acknowledging the correspondence from al-Battī and restating his claims before addressing each one. These claims are:
The Imām is among the Murji’ah.[6]
The Imām says that a Muslim may err, and this poses a conundrum as nothing should supposedly come between God and one who pursues Him.
No guidance can come from anything outside of the Quran and Sunnah.
Moral commands can only be found in these sources and what the companions agreed upon; anything beyond this is a perversion.
The Imām then begins to explicate his response by setting the premise from the time of the Prophet ﷺ and reminding al-Battī of the context he was sent within. He explains that upon accepting or denouncing Islam, the community was divided into two. God Himself addressed the believers in a certain way with certain instructions and the disbelievers in a different way. Part and parcel of the instruction towards the believers was the repeated clause of “those who believe and do righteous deeds”[7], and with this evidence base, the Imām begins to respond to the claims above.
Content Analysis: Imām Abū Ḥanīfah’s Methodological Response
As previously stated, the Imām begins his response with unambiguous precedent found in the Quran and the Prophetic community. He addresses the initial claim by explaining his viewpoint and how it aligns with orthodoxy rather than Murji’ite theology. He uses the aforementioned evidence to prove that it is possible for a Muslim to err and this does not compromise their religious identity. Based on the verses cited, belief and righteous actions are mentioned alongside each other as separate notions so they are necessarily distinct from each other. If they were the same, then a Muslim who fell short would no longer be a Muslim, but this unattainable standard cannot conceivably be imposed on people.
Another way the Imām proves this distinction is by observing that all Muslims believe in the same tenets of faith, but the extent to which that belief is professed through their actions differs. He says, “The religion of those in the heavens (angels) and the Prophets is one,” and also uses Quranic evidence to demonstrate this point. [8]
Building upon this, the Imām mentions that being guided in terms of belief (īmān) is not the same as being guided in terms of action (ʿamal). If someone believes but is ignorant of certain rulings, they can simply learn and implement them. It is not that they no longer become believers due to a discrepancy in legal understanding. No one would equate a person who has a flawed theological understanding with one who has a gap in their conception of the law. This, again, highlights how internal belief and external actions are two separate components of the Muslim identity. It is only the absence of the former, and not the latter, that would remove a person from the fold.
It is worth appreciating the method of engagement that the Imām opts for. He focuses on logical reasoning, directly addressing the scholarly mind to help al-Battī appreciate not just his conclusion, but how he arrived at it.
Even though logical reasoning was Imām Abū Ḥanīfah’s focus in the letter, his response is replete with Quranic verses to support his conclusions. He cites several verses proving the inevitability of human error, and how this establishes humanness rather than compromised religious adherence. His response also gives insight into his writing style and personality, as he makes numerous remarks to the effect of “the likes of you would understand this”. Through these, he is admitting the calibre of al-Battī and encouraging him to use his erudition to grasp his arguments.
To further illustrate his point, the Imām presents an example to show that it is conceivable for a believer of even the highest calibre to err. He presents the situation in which Yaʿqūb (‘alayhi al-salām)’s sons tell him he is “in his old error”, then poses the question: “Do you think they meant he is in his old “disbelief”? God forbid (Ḥāsha lillāh) that this is what you’ve understood from this while you are knowledgeable of the Quran!”
The Imām then engages his interlocutor rationally, using al-Battī’s claim that people were Ahl al-Taṣdīq before legislation (i.e. they affirmed faith even before legal rulings were revealed) to highlight a logical fallacy. He states that the very definition of taṣdīq, is to prove something through action. In the absence of such, how can this early group of Muslims be deemed believers? If they are indeed so, then this response of Imām Abū Ḥanīfah would be unnecessary. If they are disbelievers, then this is a perverse conclusion that contradicts everything the Quran and the Prophet ﷺ point towards. If they are neither believers nor disbelievers, then this aligns with the view of those whom al-Battī himself considers ahl al-bidʿah—the Murji’ites.
The Imām writes, “ʿAlī & ʿUmar (raḍiya Allāhu ‘anhumā) were called the Leaders of the Believers; was ‘Leaders of Those who Follow All Legislation’ intended?” He then provides multiple examples to highlight the flaw in this reasoning. Pressing further, he references the in-fighting among the Companions, asking how al-Battī would categorize these two groups, given that no sin is graver than killing—especially among the Companions. “So what would you call these two groups? They were not all right. If you suggest they were, this is a perversion. If you claim that they were both misguided, this is a perversion. If you say only one group was guided, then what is the other? If you say, ‘Allah knows best,’ then that is appropriate.”
The Imām explicitly states his orthodox theology: “Ahl al-qibla (those who face the kaʿbah in prayer) are believers. Leaving action does not remove them from the fold. If they adhere to all legislation along with faith, they are from the people of Paradise, according to us. If they abandon faith and actions, they are disbelievers, from the people of Hell. As for those who believe but abandon some action, they are believers who have erred. God decides their fate:[9] if He wills, He will forgive them. If He punishes them, it is due to their sins. If He forgives them, it means they had mistakes that were pardoned.”
After clarifying this, the Imām revisits the in-fighting among the Companions, expressing his deference to Allah. He references several notable scholars from the generation of the tābiʿūn who also stated, “This is a matter of the Prophet’s ﷺ Companions.”[10] Once more, he appeals to al-Battī’s intellect by referring to these scholars as “your brothers,” implying their parity in calibre. He concludes, “Know that the best of what you have learned and teach people is the Sunnah, and you must know its people—those who ought to be learned from (i.e., these scholars).”
The final passage of the Imām’s letter addresses the derogatory use of the label al-Murjiʾah. He references an incident explained by al-Kawtharī, who narrates: “A man from Ahl al-Sunnah was asked: ‘Where will the disbelievers end up in the Ākhirah?’ He replied, ‘Hellfire.’ ‘And where are the believers in the Ākhirah?’ He responded, ‘The believers are in two categories: a righteous, pious believer who is in Paradise, and a believer who is an outright sinner, whose fate is with Allah. If He wills, He will punish [the latter] for their sins, or if He wills, He will forgive them due to their faith.’ The questioner pressed: ‘So where will you place him?’ He replied, ‘I will not place them in any specific place, but I defer (urjiʾ) it to Allah.’ The questioner retorted, ‘You are a Murjiʾ!’” Al-Kawtharī comments: “Whoever considers someone from Ahl al-Sunnah to be among the Murjiʾah has followed the view of a heretic (Khārijī)[11] who believes in permanent damnation to Hellfire for one who commits a major sin.”[12]
Referencing this, the Imām tells al-Battī that this term originated as a derogatory label by those who were extreme and despised. He then makes a final point, appealing to al-Battī’s logic, and asks whether anyone would deny that Khārijites were extreme and despised. If this is true, then it would be an unfair usage of these descriptions— something anyone who is balanced and just (ahl al-ʿadl) would attest to. Through this, he calls upon al-Battī to be fair in assessing his theology and precise when attributing theological identities.
The Imām concludes his response by expressing his willingness to provide further details, address any contentions, and continue the correspondence if needed. He ends with formalities and this concludes the content of a well-attributed piece of writing by Imām Abu Ḥanīfah.
Conclusion & Further Reading
In modern, pluralistic societies, minor theological differences rarely carry political weight. In the 2nd century Anno Hegirae, however, this couldn’t have been further from the truth. This correspondence between Imām Abū Ḥanīfahh and ʿUthmān al-Battī illustrates how the semantics of religious language did matter, especially in an era where theology and politics were deeply intertwined. The Murjiʾah arose during a time when the Muslim community was grappling with the aftermath of the first major internal conflicts, the fitan, following the assassination of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān (ra) and the subsequent leadership struggle between ʿAlī (ra) and Muʿāwiyah (ra). A byproduct of this turbulent period was the rise of extreme factions willing to kill and denounce their fellow Muslims due to political and theological disagreements. In this context, it was crucial for scholars to clarify their positions, lest they face severe consequences.
Engaging with early scholarly works offers a window into the past. Not just in terms of their brilliance but in terms of the context that they operated within and how that influenced their language and their views. The Ḥanafī school, in particular, benefits from a series of early texts that have since been edited, annotated, and made readily available to the student of knowledge. Below is a brief list for further reading:
Imām Abū Ḥanīfah, Al-Fiqh al-Akbar, ed. Shaykh ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghuddah (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1997).
Imām Abū Ḥanīfah, Al-Wasiyyah, ed. Shaykh ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghuddah (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1997).
Imām Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Al-Jamiʿ al-Saghir, ed. Shaykh ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghuddah (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2000).
Notes
[1] Siddiqa Saidzada, “Books Attributed to Imam Abu Ḥanifa: A Historical and Analytical Overview,” The Hadith Disciple, September 30, 2024, https://thehadithdisciple.com/2024/09/30/books-attributed-to-imam-abu-%e1%b8%a5anifa-a-historical-and-analytical-overview/.
[2] The nickname al-Battī comes from the Arabic word batāt (plural batut), which refers to everyday items. He would sell everyday clothing in Baṣra, and hence was known as al-Battī. Al-Mizzī, Tadhhīb al-Kamāl fī Asmāʾ al-Rijāl, vol. 3 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1955), 493; Al-Muʿjam al-Wasīṭ, s.v. "batāt.”
[3] According to Imam Aḥmad, Abu Ḥātim al-Rāzī, Ibn Ḥibbān, Ibn Ḥajar, and al-Dārquṭnī, ʿUthmān al-Battī was considered a truthful, reliable narrator of hadith. There is one narration attributed to Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn that mentions he was a weak transmitter, but this was suggested by Imam al-Nasāʾī to be an error; he mentioned that it is likely a mistake and another narrator (ʿUthmān b. Muslim al-Barrī) was intended. [Ibn Ḥajar, Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb, Vol. 3, pg. 79]
[4]Abū Ḥanīfahh. al-ʿĀlim wa-l-Mutaʿallim: Risālat Abī Ḥanīfahh li-ʿUthmān al-Battī; al-Fiqh al-Absaṭ. Edited by Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī., 33–38.
[5] Schacht, Joseph. “An Early Murciʾite Treatise: The Kitāb al-ʿĀlim Wal-Mutaʿallim.” Oriens 17 (1964): 96–117. https://doi.org/10.2307/1580020.
[6]As will be explored at the conclusion of this paper, the label Murjiʾite carried political implications. The Murjiʾah were known for promoting tolerance, especially in contrast to the Khārijites who took a more extreme stance. While Imām Abū Ḥanīfah used language that may appear aligned with the Murjiʾah, his theology remained within orthodox Sunni bounds. For example, as discussed later in this paper, he affirmed the fluctuation of faith. This was a concept the Murjiʾah explicitly rejected.
[7] See, for example, Quran, 2:25, 2:62
[8] Quran, 12:13
[9] Al-Kawtharī explains that those who deferred judgment on major sinners were often mislabelled as belonging to the Murjiʾah. The actual stance of the Murjiʾah, however, was that as long as one possessed faith, major sins would bear no consequence in the Hereafter. This contrasts with the orthodox view, which affirms the possibility of punishment in the Hereafter (ʿuqūbah ukhrawiyyah) for major sins that are not repented for.
[10] People who said this statement include the likes ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, Nāfiʿ Mawlā Ibn ʿUmar, and Saʿīd b. Jubayr, all of whom believed that a major sin does not remove a person from the fold of Islam.
[11] His name was Nāfiʿ b. al-Azraq and he was known to be one of the leaders of the Kharijites.
[12] Abū Ḥanīfah, al-ʿĀlim wa-l-Mutaʿallim: Risālat Abī Ḥanīfah li-ʿUthmān al-Battī; al-Fiqh al-Absaṭ, ed. Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī (n.p.: n.d.), 38.
